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CONCLUSION
I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N.
The student of the law of Eminent Domain cannot but be
impressed at the outset with the magnitude of the questions
i*volved,and the vast amount of attention that they have
received in the courts of the Country. The cases number many
thousand,and form a vast and confusing mass of material from
which it is a difficult -matter to choose the best and eliminate
that which possesses least merit. Among the important
sub-divisions of Eminent Domain is found the question: "What
constitutes a taking of private property for a public use ?",
and I shall endeavor to answer this question to the best of
my ability, realizing the immensity of the task and the necessavF
brevity of this article. It has been impossible to examine
all the cases under each head,or to make copious extracts from
opinions,so I have been obliged to confine myself largely to
bare statements of fact,illustrating each by a case or two from
leading jurisdictions. In this work and in general arrange-
ment of ideas I have consulted and am especially indebted to
"Lewis on Eminent Domain","Mills on Eminent Domain" "Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations",and the "American and English
Encyclopedia of Law". My plan has been to give as briefly
as possible a short account of those necessary principles
of Eminent Domain upon which this subject restsin my first
chapter,followed by other chapters on property and taking in
general,land,streets and highwaysand water and watercourses,
somewhat after the plan adopted by Mr Lewis in his estimable
work on Eminent Domain. TJhile at best my treatise of the
subject has been general,fewif any leading principles have
been neglected. We will now proceed to a discussion of
the subject involved.
CHAPTER I.
GENERAL FEATURES OF EMINENT DOMAIN.
Distinguished from taxation and the police power. It is an
absolute necessity,from the very nature of Governmentthat every
sovereignty should possess buildingsland and other property
which it holds fot the use of its officers and agents to aid
them n performing their public function. Land may also be
heeded to provide for public defence,internal improvementsor
other objects necessary to carry out the purposes of govern-
ment. This land must be held by the stgteas property is
held by the individualand such property constitutes the or-
dinary domain of the state. Inherent in sovereignty are
certain'-powers and rights. Some of these rights are complete
without any action on the part of the state,e.g.,the right of
navigation of the seasrivers,lakes,et , the right of fishery
in public waters,the right to precious metals etc.,but other
rights become complete only when the state has displaced the
rights of private individuals and has assumed control itself.
This may be accomplished by two methods:
1. By contract with the individual owner,and
2. By appropriating his property.
With the first of these methods we have nothing to
do,but with the second,everything,for this method of appro-
priating private property to the state is called "Eminent
Domain'.' "Eminent Domain is the rightful authority,which
exists in every sovereignty,to control and regulate those
rights of a public nature which pertain to its citizens in
common,and to appropriate and control individual property~or
the public benefit,as the public safetynecessitycconvenience,
or welfaremay demand! (a)
The theory upon which this power is exercised is
that all property ultimately rests in the state,and the state
in exercising eminent domain is only resuming its own again.
But this power must not be confounded with powers of taxation
or police powers which are also inherent in sovereignty. "The
police power is that inherent and plenary power in the state
which enables it to impose such wholesome restraint upon the
exercise of private rights as will prevent the infliction of
injuries on others in the enjoyment of their rights" (b)
To put it briefly -to insure to each the unint~rrupted enjoy-
ment of his own,so far as is reasonably consistent with the
like enjoyment of rights by others. "Taxation is the auth-
ority vested in every sovereigh state to compel contributions
from persona and property for public purposes. It is a burden
imposed by the legislative power upon persons or propertyto
raise money for public purposes (c).
(a) Vattel, Chap.20 #34
(b) Cooley's Const. Lim. p. 704.
(c) Blackwell on Tax Titles,p 1.
From these definitions we can readily see that
neither the power to tax,or the police power,are identical
with the power of eminent domain,which deprives anman of his
property,sometimes entirely divesting him of title thereto,
upon making suitable compensation to him therefor.
By whom exercised in the United States. From the peculiar
nature of our government we are sometimes at a loss to know
just where the power to exercise the right of eminent domain
lies. We have two distinct and separate sovereignties
existing within the same territory,each restricted in the exer-
cite of its powers by the Constitution of the United States(a).
For a summary of the powers that each may exercise see The
Cornell Law Journal of June 1894,p.16,as follows:
" I. By virtue of its right of Eminent Domain a state may
take for public use:
1. Private Property within the state.
2. Property already impressed with a public use by
the state.
3. Property of the United Stated within a state,
(whether already impressed with a public use or
not. Query.)
4. property already impressed with a public use by
the United States. Query.
II. The United States has likewise the Right of Eminent
Domain to take for a public use:
Ableman v Booth, 21 Howard 623.
1. Private property whether in territory over which
it has exclusive jurisdictionor within a state.
2. Property already impressed with a public use .by
the United States,(or a state. Query.)
3. Property of a state, (whether already impressed
with a public use or not. Query.) " (Subject
always to the limitation that it must be for a proper public
use) (a)
To exercise this power of eminent domain some legis-
lative action is necessary,b~th when exercised by the United
States or by the states. In the Federal --Government Congress
has the sole power to authorize,but in the states this is exer-
cised by the legislature,which decides what shall be a proper
public use. The methods and procedure to be followed in
the taking are prescribed by these bodies,the usual method
being to appoint a board of commissioners who determine and
assess the damage,although in some cases a jury is allowed (b):
This power may be delegated. The right to exercise this
power may be delegated to private corporations,which,although
essentially organized for private gain,stand in such a relation
to the public that they may be considered as promoting the
public convenience,or carrying on work of general public
utility. Such are railroad companiesbridge and turn-pike
(a) Kohl v United States,'91 U.S. 367. Cherokee Nation v
South Kansas Ry Co. 135 U.S.641.
(b) Cooley's Const. Lim. p.538
People v Smith,21 N.Y.595.
corporationsand the like. The public necessity or convenience
is the test as to whether the power may be delegated.or not.(a)
The pupose. The purpose for which the power of eminent
domain is to be exercised must be public and not merely for
the benefit of a private person,although private gain will
not defeat the power,if it actually concerns or promotes the
welfare,comfortor convenience of the whole people. There
is no power to compel the'taking of property from one man and
a giving to another for his sole private use,even though he
make just compensation (b). In any case the question as to
whether a given use is a public one is a judicial question
and must be determined by the Court(c).
What property can be taken. The property contemplated by
the Constitution,is anything that the law recognizes as such,
and,in respect to which,the owner is entitled to a remedy
against anyone who disturbs him in the enjoyment thereof.
This property may be tangible or intangible,and the interest
in it temporary or permanent,but if taken the owner is entitled
to compendation.(d)
Compensation. One of the great principles upon which the
exercise of eminent domain rests is compensation. No man can
T-hYBeekan v Saratoga R.Co. 3 Paige 45. Secombe v Railroad
Co. 23 Wallace,108.
(b) Tyler v Beecher,44 Vt. 648. Bankhead v Brown,25 Ia,540
(c) For a full list of purposes adjudged public,see Stimson's
American Statute Law #1141 and cases.
(d) See post.
be deprived of his absoltte rights without some reparation
made him. It is true that private rights must yield to
the superior necessities of the public as a whole,but the
public must pay for the increased benefits which it receives.
The right to compensation,although guaranteed by the Consti-
tution itself,does not depend upon it,but upon the inherent
right in the individual. Therefore we may safely say that
in all cases where there has been a taking,compensation must be
made.
Constitutional Limitations. In the Constitution of the
United States,and in each of the state constitutions (a),
provisions have been inserted governing and limiting the exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain. These provisions are
generally exemplified by the two leading limitations in the
Federal Constitution. From Article V of the Amendments we
find these words " NOR SHALL PRIVATE PROPERTY BE TAKEN FOR
PUBLIC USE WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION" Section one of
the XIVth Amendment adds "Nor shall any state deprive any
person of life,liberty,or property,without due process of
law!
These constitutional limitations upon the power of eminent
domain,are seemingly very plain and definite,but there are,
(a) One exception - North Carolina.
7nevertheless,important ambi,,uities. These are found in the
word "taken" and in the phrases "public use" and "just compen-
sation". With the questions as to what constitutes a public
use,and when just compensation has been made,we are not to
deal. The other question, "What constitutes a taking ?",forms
the basis of this article and the question with which we are
to deal in qubsequent chapters.
CHAPTER I I
PROPERTY AND TAKING IN GENERAL.
Methods of Taking. There are two classes of cases which
are held to constitute a taking of private property. The
one where the fee to the property itself has been taken (a),
the other where the property itself remains intact,but some
act done by legislative authority imposes an additional burden
upon the property and so causes it to deteriorate in value (b).
In bbth cases the owner of the property taken is entitled to
compensation,and in the first class of cases there is little
difficulty; with the second class we find more trouble,for
Courts will differ as to whether an additional burden is
sufficient or not to amount to a taking. Such burden may
consist of a real,structural,or physical injury to the property
of an interference with certain rights appurtenant theretoor
enjoyed in connection therewith,or a mere deterioration in
value. We will now proceed to a discussion of these various
additional butdens,and determine to our own satidfaction at
least,whether they constitute such a taking as is contemplated
by the Constitution.
Projerty. To determine what constitutes a taking of property
(a) Cushan v Smith,35 Me. 247.
(b) People v Haines, 49 N.Y. 587. Pumpelly v Green Bay Co.
13 Wall. 166.
it becomes necessary to determine what property actually is.
In a loose acceptation of the term property is often reckoned
as the thing itself,but is this true ? Long before the ad-
vent of man,animals in a state of nature roamed upon the land.
With the coming of man the land was reduced to his dominionand
certain animals to domesticity. In this no corporeal
change was produced in the land and animals themselvesbut,
nevertheliss,they had now become property,by the act of man
in reducing them to possession. He had obtained rights over
them subject only to the superior right of the common good,and
the fact that he must use that which he had in a manner not
interfering with the rights of others. His property con-
sists not in the things themselves,but in the right he has
over them,and this is the only meaning of property that we can
accept under the Constitution. The sovereign people who
ordained and declared our Constitution said "You must not take
our private property for public use without making us a just
compensation therefor"and by this they meant not only corpor-
eal things but also that bundle of rights pertaining thereto
Changes in the Law. The law as to what constitutes a taking
has undergone a great change in the last half century. The
Supreme Court of Maine,in 1852,said "The design appears simply
to declare that private property shall not be changed to public
property or transferred from the owner to other~for a public
use without dust compensation (a).
T_--dushman v Smith,34 Me-247. ........
This view seems to exclude all idea of consequential
damage to property and may be reckoned as a fair statement of
the law existing at that time,but this view has gradually
changedand the case contributing most to this change is
Eaton v B.C.&.M RR.Co (a). The defendant railroad company
had laid out its road through plaintiff's farm,and had paid
assessed damages . In constructing their road they cut throug,
a ridge near the farm,and a freshet carried gravel through the
cut thus madeand covered plaintiff's farm,spoiling the land
for agricultural purposes. In an action brought to recover
damages,it was held that he ought to succeed. The Court said
"Property is the right of any person to possess,use,enjoy,and
dispose of a thing. If property in lands consists of cert-
ain essential rights,and a physical,interference with the land
substantially subverts one of those tights,such interference
takes,pro tanto,the owner's property ..... Two narked
characteristics distinguish this injury from that described
in many other cases. Firstit is a physical injury to the
land itself,a physical interference with the rights of pro-
perty,an actual disturbance of plaintiffs possession.
Second. It would clearly be actionable if done by a private
persoh without legislative authority! The plaintiff had a
right to the protection of the natuiral barriers against the
(a) 51 N.H.504.
overflow of the river. The acts of the defendant company
in breaking that barrier amounted to a taking for which he was
entitled to compensation.
Two years later the same court reviewed this caseand
affitmed the principle in even stronger language in Thompson
v Androscoggin Improvement Co.(a),and other courts have followe
almost universally. So we may regardit as settled law
that an actual dispossession is not necessary if there has
been such an actual interference with the property as to de-
prive of valuable rights.
(a) 54 N.H.545.
"Depriving an owner of property of one of its essential attri-
butes is depriving him of valuable rights,and renders compen-
sation necessary"
People v Ctis,90 N.Y.48,at p 52.
Pumpelly ii Green Bay Co,13 Wall.166.
Connif v SanFrancisco,67 Cal.45
Grand Rapids Booming Co. v Jarvis,30 Mich.308.
Seifert v Brooklyn,101 N.Y.136.
Lahr v Met. Elevated Co. 104 N.Y.268.
CHAPTER I I I
WHAT CONSTITUTES A TAKING.
LAND.
Value of Enlish Precedent. Many cases concerning the ques-
tion as to what constitutes a taking of land for a public use
have arisen in England,but it is not the purpose of this treat-
ise to give much attention to such cases. Indeed,most of
them are inapplicable to our dif:'erent system of goverment. In
Engladd Acts of parlIament are the supreme power of the land.
Courts cannot declare a wrong what an act of Parliament has
made lawful,if the Act of Parliament has been faithfully exe-
cuted. In the United States a legislature is powerless to
make lawful that which the Constitution prohibits. When the
execution of a pikblic work causes damage,in the United states,
the Courts not only inquire as to the lawful purpose of the
Act,but also whether the damage amounts to a taking. If it
does,the Constitution provides a remedy, -;ust compensation. (a)
Interfering with a easement. Interfering with the rights,.
appurtenant to property is a taking within the meaning of the
Constitution,and easements are among the rights appurtenant
to property. When public works destroy such easements
TaOCraWford v Village of Delaware,7Ohi-o- ]t.458
compensation must be made. An instance of this is given in
Willey v Norfolk & Southern Railroad (a) . In this case the
plaintiff had a right of way across the defendants road bed.
the defendant company obstructed this right of way,and when
the bars were cut down by the plaintiff,repeatedly put them
up again. The Court held this a burden upon the owner of the
easement and a taking of his property (b). One having a
mere parol license to hunt and fish,has no such interest as
entitled him to compensation (c).
Injuries by blastina. It is a common practice in the
donstruction of public works to resort to blasting,and frwquen-
tly large quantities of debris are thrown upon the adjoining
land. This is a-viblation of the right of exclusion and com-
pensation must be made in some form or other. As to the
method of makir compensation the cases differ. Some hold
that compensation was included in the original award,and that
spearate actions will not lie.(d) The better cases hold,
however,that inasmuch as the consequences of the blasting were
not foreseen and provided for in the original award separate
action will lie.for the additional burden imposed upon the
(a) 96 N.C.408.
(b) This principle is also strongly set forth in Arnold v
Hudson River R.R.Co 55 N.Y.601,affd in Story v N.Y.Elevated
R.R.Co,'90 N.Y. 149.
(c) Bird v Great Eastern R.R.Co. 34 L.J.C.P.366. See also
Boston Gas Co. v Old Colony & Newpprt R.R.14 Allen 444
(d) Sabin v Vermont Central Ry,25 Vt.363. Dodge v County
Commissioners 3 1,Metc.380. Whitehouse v Androscoggin R.R.
Co. 52 Me,208.
property (a). Of course in the case that damage is
done to the land of a person from whom there was no taking
originallyand to whom no award has been made,the grounds for
his recovery,under either of the previous holdings,are clear.
Justifiable Entry u Land. The rights of property gave
the owner power to excluide from his land any person that he
may see fitbut certain cases may arise where an entry in
necessary in order to prosecute some public work or in some
way to promote the ends of government. According to Orr v
Quimby (b) such entry must be necessarymade with the least
possiable injuryand continued only a reasonable time. If
entry is made in accordance with the above,it does not con-
stitute a taking of property. If possession be continued
an unreasonable time,the person making the entry becomes an
trespasser ab initio (c). He cannot make experimental
works or excavations.(d) The following have been held to
be justified by necessity and not a taking of property. Pre-
liminary surveys (e),measuring public boundaries (f),and Uni-
ted States coast Surveys(g),. In many states this question is
(a) StPeterv Dennison,58 N.Y.416. Carman v Indiana,4 O.St.399
(b) 54 N.H.590
(c) Cushman v Smith,34 Me 247.
(d) M & E R.R.Co v Hudson Tunnel Co. 25 N.J.Eq.384.
(e) State v Seymour,35 N.J.Law 47 at 53.
(f) Winslow v Giffard,6 Cush 327
(g) Orr v Quimby,54 1N.H.590.
regulated by statute.
Incidental Injuries to business. Loss and inconvenience
resulting from the temporary obstruction of highways by reason
of public improvements do not constitute a taking,when carried
on In a proper manner. The reason for this lies in the super-
ior right of the public to make improvements (a).
R I of Exclusion. Any invasion of property,whether above
or below the surface is a taking,tbus -constructing a ditch (b)
passing under land with a tunnel(c),laying water pipes in the
soil etc,are all such burdens as make compensation necessary.
Public authorities cannot interfere with a private way save
upon making compensation (d).
Right of Support. Every owner of land has a right to the
lateral support of the soil in its natural condttion,and
public excavations so near the land of a private individual
that his soil is undermined and slides off,constitutes a taking
of propertyas much as if the property itself had been invaded.
He has a right,good against all the world,to have his land
stand firm.(e) This doctring has been denied in Maine and
(a) Northern Transportation Co.v Chicago,99 U.S.635. No damages
can be allowed for injuries to business. Texas & St Louis
Ry v Matthews,60 Texas 215. Hooker v hTew Haven & North-
Hampton Co,15 Conn 312.
(b) People v Haines,49 N.Y.587.
(c) Sparrow v Oxford Co.2 DeG,McN.& G.94.
(d) Morse v Starker,l Allen 150
(e) Gilmore v Driscoll,122 1,Tass,199.
Kentucky on the ground that the act of the legislatureauth-
orizing the public workwas a licenseand negligence only
would render liable (a).
Pollution of the Atmosphere. Everyone must use his pro-
perty in such a manner as not to interfere with the rights of
others. If,therefore,an owner of land discharges smoke,
dustor noxious vapor into the air,and it interferes with his
neighbor's enjoyment of property,it is a nuisance (b). But
where a business authorized by legislative act interferes with
the right to pure air,it is a taking of property (c).
Franchises. A franchise may generally be defined as "a
special privilege conferred by government upon individuals,
which does not belong to the citizens of a country generally
as of common right (d). Examples of franchises are the
right to construct,maintain and operate a ferry,turnpike,canal,
telegraph line or street railway,and are of two classes.
First,exclusive franchises,for instanceone forbidding any
other person or corporation from engaging in the same business
within certain territory. Second: non-exclusive franchises
where the grant is silent in the above respect.
The principal way in which a franchise can be taken
is by impairing its valueso we can dispose of non-exclusive
(a) Boothby v Androscoggin Ry.51 Me 31B. Hortsman v Covington
&c Ry,18 B Monroe (Ken) 218.
(b) Wood on Nuisances.
(c) Suffolk v Parker,79 Va,660. lMorgan v Binghamton,32 Hun 602
(d) Bank of Augusta v Earle,13 Peters 595.
franchises very easily. Incidental damage to a non-exclusive
franchise by a rival company has been settled by a leading
case of this nature,The Charles River Bridge v Warren Bridge(a)
and another good case in point is that of Fort plain Bridge
Co. v Smith (b). Here the plaintiff had a toll-bridgeand
defendant erected a free bridge only forty-nine feet away. It
waa held that he had no remedy.
Where the franchise is exclusive the question arises
as to what impairment of value will amount to a taking. The
franchise is a contract between the corporation and the state,
so a subsequent grant of a similar franchise within the pre-
scribed limits would be impairing the obligation of such con-
tractand would be void,and the exercise by a rival company ,
under legislative grant,would amount to a taking (d).
Taxation and Police power. In the first chapter the
difference between eminent domain,taxation,and the police
power has been fully discussed,but,nevertheless,it has often
been thought to prove a taking under the guise of these powers.
While at first glance it may often seem that the interferences
with property by them would constitute a taking,yet when we
(a) 7 Pick.344.
(b) 30 N.Y.44
(c) Dartmouth College v Woodward,4 Wheaton 625
(d) Boston & Lowell Ry. v Salem & Lowell Ry 2 Gray 1. Power v
Village of Athens,99 N.Y.592.
yet when we stop to think of the general differences between
these powers,and that of eminent dorain,the problem is riot
so difficult after all. The only cases where taxation has
been held to be a taking are cases of assessment for local
improvement,and the annexation of farming land to a city for
the purpose of increasing the taxable property,but the current
of authority is the other way. The question must largely
depend upon the jurisdiction in which it arises. Under
the police power the only case that nearly approaches a taking
that I have been able to discover was a case,where in draining
swampy land pipes were laid across the land of another (a),
and this case canin realitybe taken outside the police power
entirely,and based upon other grounds.
(a) Cavanaugh v Boston 139 Mass,426.
CHAPTER IV
WHAT CONSTITUTES A TAKING.
STREETS AND HIGHWAYS.
In General. Streets are laid out primarily to accomodate the
public,by facilitating travel from place to place,but there are
other uses to which streets are put,especially in populous
places,which,when considered as a benefit to the highway are
of positively no use whateverbut whichneverthelessare vastly
beneficial to large numbers of citizens along the street. It
is with these we have to deal in this chapter. Nothing
placed below the surface of the street is apt to place any
obstacle in the way of travellers,but when we arrive at the
consideration of structures built in the streets,as elevated
railwaystelegraph poles and the like,we are met with a problem
which largely depends upon the actual facts of the case in
issue., We will first consider the cases of improvements
under the surface of the street,reserving for consideration
later in the chapter,the question of other obstructions.
Sewers and Drains. It is absolutely essential for the
health of the public that the refuse of the city be carried
away,and it is the duty of the city authorities to provide
suitable drains for so doing. They may use the streets for
this purpose by constructing sewers beneath the surface,and '
this imposes no burden upon the adjoining lot owners (a). Open,
drains for carrying off surface water may also be constructed(b)
Water pipes and Gas ppes
.
. A supply of pure and wholesome
water is indispensable to the health and well being of all
people. Streets are properly used when pipes are laid
below the surface for this purpose (c). As to water pipes
in a country highway I have been unable to find authoritybut
judging from an analogous case(d),where the laying of natural
gas pipes in a public highway was held to be an additional
butden,I should say that such use of the highway would aon-
stitute a case for compensation. The use of city streets
for gas pipes is universal,and along this same line steam
pipes or undergroun# conduits for electric wires will be per-
mitted (e).
Telegraph and Telephone Lines. A city cannot grant the
right to place telegraph and telephone poles in its streets
without the consent of the legislature (f),but where such con-
sent is obtained the question becomes one of fact as to whether
(a) Cone v Hartford,28 Conn. 363.
(b) White v Yazoo City,27 Miss.357
(c) Crook v Flatbush Waterworks Co. ,29 Hun 245.
(d) Bloomfield Gas Co. v Calkins 62 H.Y.386.
(e) Carli v Railroad Co. 28 Minn.at 376.
(f) Telegraph Co v Newark,49 N.J.Law 344'.
there is a taking or not,for the poles may be so placed as to
avoid all damage to property by shutting off access to it from
the street. Where they co interfere in the slightest manner
there is a taking,for the use of poles In the street is foreign
to the ordinary purpose of the streetand the abutting owner
may recover for the additional burden placed upon his land.(a)
Public Markets. In many cities of our country it is custom-
ary to have a certain place set aside as a market where hucks-,
ters and others can dispose of their wares. When a portion
of a street is devoted to such purpose the adjoining owner is
entitled to compensation for his property which has been
damaged. (b)
Street Grade Cases. These cases arise from necessary
improvements in the streetsas towns and cities grow,and
changes become necessary to meet the new conditions of things.
Grades must be raised or lowered. New streets laid out and
improved,and general changes made. The usual doctrine in the
United States is that where a grade is raised or lowered and
there is no physical injury to the abutting property,there
can be no recovery of damageswhen the change is a proper one
and authorized by law. This doctrine was f~rst promulgated
in the case of Callender v Marsh (c),and is followed in almost.
(a) Board of Trade v Barnett,107 Iii.507 Broome v N.Y.&
N.J.Te~ephone Co,42 N.J.Eq.141.
(b) State v Lavanac,34 N.J.Law,201
(c) 1 pick. 417.
all other American states(a). A long line of Ohio cases holU. *
the contrary doctrine,and permit recovery,claiming that such
acts constitute a taking. The power to change grades is a
continuing one,and rests with the municipal authorities to
be exercised by them for the public benefit,but where a city
establishes a grade and pledges that such grade shall not
be changed,the city will be compelled to fulfill to the
letter its agreement(b),and in all other cases of unlawful (c)
or negligent(d) changes of grade,the abutting owner can recover
Where the street is lowered so much that the lateral support of
the soil is destroyed,the early cases hold that the abutting
owner has no remedy,but later,and it seems to me better,cases
hold that compensation must be made (e),or that a retaining
wall be btilt in the street itself. Neither has the city
the right to encroach upon the property of the adjoining
owner by dumping refuse so that it will fall upon his land or
turning surface water so that it will form a stagnant pool on
his land (f). As a general proposition a city interferes
with the flow of a natural stream at its peril.(g)
Vacatin, Streets. A municipal corporation has inherent
power to vacate streets as the occadion may demand,but when
(a) Radcliffe's Exrs v 1,Mayor of Brooklyn,4 :Y.195
(b) Goodall v Milwaukee,5 Wis. 32.
(c) Hill v St Louis,59 Mo 412.
(d) North Vernon v Voegler,103 Ind. 314.
(e) Keating c Cincinnatti,38 O.St.141.
(f) Nevins v City of Peoria,41 Ill.502.
(g) Dore br Milwaukee,42 Wis,108.
in so doing,they deprive a property owner of means of access
to his property,compensation must be made(a).
Street Railroads.- General observations. The street railway
problem has been one of the most fruitful sources of litigation
connected with the entire subject of eminent domain,and,in
many cases,great hardhhip has been worked to the owner of
the abutting property.by such roadswhich,while they are un-
doubtedly of value to the travelling public,often damage pro-
perty by smoke,cinders,noise etc.,and often,especially in the
case of elevated roads,by shutting off light and air. As every
one has a right to choose whatever mode of locomotion he
pleases,and as street railways are creatures of legislative
sanction only,we must conclude that they are not legitimately
in the highway because not constituting a use for which high-
ways were designed. Therefore in order that a railway may
occupy a street some legislative action is necessary,and the
terms prescribed by the legislature must be strictly followed(b
Raiiroads across htghways. In highways the abutting owner
has always certain rights whether the fee rests in the public
or whether the public has merely an easement therein. W'hen a
railroad crosses the highway it often cuts off certain of these
(a) Transylvania University v Lexington,3 B.Monroe (Ken) 25.
(b) Lewis on Eminent Domain, # 110 - 118 inclusive.
rights no matter if on the surface above the grade or by sub-
way. These crossings often necessitate a taking of proper-
ty for lateral approaches,and as these purposes are for the
sole benefit of the railroad company,and do not improve the
street in any way,it necessarily follows that compensation
must be made (a),but,as a general proposition,when the fee to
the street is in the municipalitythe municipality itself
E annot recover unless the railroad is unlawfully in the street.
Steam and Elevated Railroads. It can be readily seen that
the operation of a steam railway is not within the contemplated
uses to which streets were to be put,and such use is only
granted by legislative authority. The use of steam in the
highway to propel cars is a source of lasting annoyance and
damage to owners of property along the route,for escaping
steam and cinders,vibrations of the soil etc. caused by the
running of trains are not to be reckoned as a legitimate use
of the highway such as is possessed by ordinary travellers.
When the fee to the highway is in the abutting owner he may
recover for the additional burden (b). These same principles
that apply to surface roads are also applicable to elevated
roads. If the fee to the street is in the abutting owner,
he can recover as in the case of steam railroads,but if the
fee is in the public he is still entitled to compensation for
(a) Starr v Camden R.R. 24 N.J.Law.592. Commonwealth v'Hart-
ford and New Haven R.R. 14 Gray 379.
(b) Pacific R.R.Co v Reed 41 Cal.256. Ford v Santa Cruz,5 : 2al
290.
losof light and airfor these cumbersome structures in the
streets 4re frequently very detrimental to business and inter-
fere with the enjoyment of one's property. The leading
cases illustrating this principle are to be found in Story v
N.Y.Elevated Ry Co. (a) and in Lahr v Metropolitan Elevated
Ry (b),but other states follow with cases nearly as emphatic,
so we may regard the law on this point as practically settled.
Horse Railways. Most courts are inclined to put horse-
railways within the legitimate uses of the street,placing
them more upon the footing of cab or omnibus linesand so deny
compensation to the owners of property along the street(c),but
New York in a line of excellent cases denies the right to
operate horse-railways without compensation any more than Other
railwaysplacing all upon an equal footing when the fee is in
the adjoining ownerbut when the fee is in the public the
abutting owner is denied compensation(d),and has no recourse
to the courts of law.
(a) 90 N.Y.122
(b)104 N.Y.268
(6) Atty Genl v Metropolitan R.R.125 Mass 515. Carson v Central
Railroad Co. 35 Cal.325.
(d) Craig v Rochester R. 39 N.Y.404.
CHAPTER V
WHAT CONSTITUTES A TAKING.
WATER AND WATERCOURSES.
General observations. In considering the question of
water and watercourses we are confronted at the outset with
several conditions which demand out attentionand these con-
ditions are largely due to the navigability or non-havigability
of the watercourse in question. A wqtercourse may be roughly
defined as "a stream with well defined banks and bed in which
water habitually flows! Of these certain streams are
navigable and others are not. Of the navigable streams cer-
tain of them are open to the pleasure of the public at large,
while others are controlled entirely by private owners. In
this chapter the status of each class will be examined and
commented upon.
Rights of Riparian Owners.in the flow of a Stream. We start
this discussion with the wellnowa fact that every riparian
proprietor has a right to the flow of the strear~in undiminis-
hed quantitiesand this is true both as to public and private
waters (a). This being the case any interference withor
(a) Lux v Haggin,69 Cal.250
pollution of a stream by an exercise of emiy~ent domain is a
taking,and must necessarily be compensated for. There are
various methods of interfering with the flow of a stream which
we will separately consider:
A
BY TAKING THE WATER FROM ABOVE. Loss of water itself con-
stitutes a taking,and any diminution from above contributes to
the wrong. If done by a private person the remedy is injunc-
tion and damages. If done by an exercise of eminent domain,
the remedy is compendation for the taking. The property
owner has been deprived of a natural and inherent right.
Thus - water diferted for a city supply(a),canal(b),water tanks
of railroad company in unreasonable quantities(c),ditches to
improve the highway(d),and improvement of navigation (e),are
all held to be a taking. The manner of taking and the
purpose for which taken does not matter. It is the loss of
the water that constitutes the injury.
B.
INCREASING THE FLOW OR DIVERTING THE CURRENT. The leading
case upon this point is Mayor of Baltimore v Apphold(f),where
the city proposed to turn into a small stream,running through
(a) Aetna Mills v Brookline,127 Mass,69
(b) Heilman v Union Canal Co. 50 Pa St. 268.
(c) Garwood v New York Central,83 N.Y.400
(d) State v Supervisors,66 Wis.199
(e) 1 Abbott 246,Avery v Fox. Contra 29 Miss.21.
(f) 42 Md.442.
defendant's land,a large quantity of water to supply a reser-
voir. This additional amount would overflow and materially
damage the defendLnt's field. An injunction was ;;ranted
until the city re,uilarly acquired the land by condemnation
proceedings.
On the same principle also a person may make reasonable
use of the water as it passes his landeven diverting the
course of the stream,but he must return it to its old bedand
it must reach his neighbor below in undiminished quantitiesand
as it was wont to flow by nature. Thus,where a booming com-
pany dammed a stream taking all the water for certain periods
and then letting it off in splashes for the purpose of floating
logs,a saw mill owner below was held to be deprived of a
valuable property right (a). Other changes in the current
also entitled to compensation when the~damage private property,
and bridges are the most common causes of such changes in the
current (b).
Works setting back the current by raising the water
and flooding property also constitute a takingand entitle the
owner of the flodded lands to compensation (c),as do workd
polluting the waters of the stream. Common examples of this
(d)
are discharges of foul water from a paper mill,sawdust from a
manufacturing plant(e),noxious matter from sewers(f) and the
(a) Thunder Bay Booming Co v Speechly,31 Mich,336.
(b) Rowe v Granite Bridge Company,21 Pick.344
(c) Grand Rapids Booming Co v Jarvis,30 Mich,321 Affd. in
Thompson v Androscoggin River Imp Co. 54 N.H.545.
(d) Gladfelter v Walker,40 Md 1
(e) Merrifield v Lombard,13 Allen 16.
(f) Hooker Y Bochaster,37 Hun 181.
like.
What are pblic streams. At common law all streams and
waters in which the tide ebbed and flowed were regarded as
navigable and the soil below high water mark was public pro-
perty (a) The reason for this was probably owing to the fact,
that Englandts navigable streams were mostly of this character-
In adopting the common Law of England we found that this par-
ticular part of it would not fit well into our changed con-
ditions owing to the fact that America has scores of navigable
rivers where this condition does not exist,and in many Ameri-
can states a navigable stream is regarded as one useful for
purposes of navigation and commerce without regard to the tide
at all. But mant states hold to the English rule. All we
need to remember is that In a public navigable stream the
title to the bed of the stream is in the public,and the title
to the great freshwater lakes is in the public from low water
mark.
Rights of Riparian Owners.in Public Navigable Streams. An Act
of the Legislature making a private stream navigable and pub-
lic does not cut off any of the rights of a riparian owner in
the use of the water(b),but their rights are subject to the
paramount rights of the public to use and improve the stream
as a highway. This public right is merely a sort of easement
(a) Angell on Watercourses # 542-551.
(b) Walker v Board of Public Works 16 0/540.
to pass and repass, -nothing more(a) The New York Court of
Appeals said "The legislature,except under the power of emi-
nemt domaincan interfere with such streams only for the pur-
pose of regilating,preserving and protecting this public ease-
ment. It has no more power cver these fresh water streams
than over other private property. It may make laws for regu-
lating dams,ferries and bridges only so far as is necessary ,
and when it goes further it invades private rights protected
by the ConstitutionU The whole thing is in this case very
well stated,and if these rights are invaded under the exercise
of the powers which the Legislature has,compensation must be
made (b). The public easement includes the right to im-
prove the channel for purposes of navigationand is limited to
the bed of the stream(c).
Interfering with the flow of the stream. New York holds that
the public has the absolute right to appropriate the water of
public streams in any way it sees fit without compensation to
the riparian owner(d) This seems to be a hard rule,and
gives the state power to work unlimited mischief if it should
choose so to do,for all the water of a stream might be taken,
leaving the owners below without a remedy. This New York
rule does not seem to be a general one and exactly the same
TChenango Bridge Co. v Paige783 N.Y.118.7
(b) Canal Commissioners v Kemphall,26 Wend.404.
(c) Lewis on Eminent Domain #71.
(d) Canal Commissioners v The people, 5 Wend.423.
rules regarding the flow exist as in the case of private
streams (a).
Riparian Owners on Public Waters. The state holds the title
to public waters as a sort of trustee for the use of the public
in common. But the riparian owner has certain valuable
rights appurtenant to his estate which must not be destroyed.
He has the right to navigate the streamfishuse the-water in
his business land boats at his property and the right to an
obstructed access to the channel of the stream(b). These
riparian rights are property and cannot be taken away without
paying just compensation therefor. A railroad,between high
and low water mark even though authorized by the legislature
cannot exercise this right without making compensation to the
abutting owners(d),nor can a city dump mud and debris in the
stream in front of privat3 property so as to cut off access
to the channel. If any of these things are done by legis-
lative authorityit is a taking of a valuable right which is
the private property of the riparian owner.
Sewers. Although the cases are almost uniform in holding
that a city is not liable for failure to rpovide a sufficient
system of sewerage,yet the discharge from sewers must be made
in such a manner as to injure no one. If a sewer be discharged
(a) Myers v St Louis,8 Mo App. 266. Commonwealth v Boston &
Maine R.R.,3 Cush.25.
(b) Yates v Milwaukee,10 Wall.497.
(c) Union Depot Co. v Brunswick 31 Minn.297.
(d) Railway Co v Renwick 102 U.S.180.
upon private property(a) into a private canal (b),or mill-
pond(c) or into any water so as to prevent access to a wharf
by mud or filth(d) the city will be liable.
Percolation Etc. Causing water to flow upon land is a
clear violation of the right of exclusive enjoyment which
every owner of land possesses. Thus percolation or seeping
of water from a mill-pond,camal or reservoir,which causes
damgge to adjacent property is a taking of property (e),as in
the case where water escaped from the tank of a railroad com-
pany and froze upon plaintiff's land(f).
Surface Water. Surface water is water that falls upon
the earth and flows naturally by force of gravity till it
reaches some watercourse or sinks into the earth/ Generally
speaking,an owner of land has no right to dam up his land so
as to prevent the water from a higher proprietor flowing
natunally upon his land/ The lower proprietor has a sort of
servient tenementand in turn he has a sort of dominant tene-
ment over the property below in the right to get rid of the
water by allowing it to flow as it will. The decisions are
by no means uniformhoweverfor many states hold directly
opposite as the rules governing property differ in the several
VaFSmith vAtlanta75 G ll0.
(b) Boston Rolling Mills v Cambridge,117 Mass,396.
(c) Mills v Nashville,63 N.H.42
(d) Haskell v New Bedford,108 Mass,208
(e) Ellington v Bennett,59 Ga. 286.
(f) Chicago and Northwestern Ry v Hoag,90 Ili.339
states.
Certain interferences with surface water in the exer-
cise of eminent domainconstitute a taking of private property.
A railroad company must not build its embankment in such a
manner as to dam up surface water,and set it back in stagnant
pools upon the lands of a neighboring proprietor(a),and,in
general,collecting water and casting it off where it has not
flowed before is-taking(b) Municipal corporations are
also liable upon the same grounds in the execution of a public
work. Subterannean waters may in general be put in the same
class as percolating waters(d),but pollution of such waters
will not be allowed any more than of a stream upo$ the surface
of the earth(.e) Neither has any person a right to remove any
natural barriers that protect his neighbors land from the
action of water.(f)
(a) Gillham v Madison County R.R.Co. 49 Ill.484.
(b) Crawfordsville v Bond,96 Ind.236.
(c) Bowman v New Orleans,27 La. Ann. 501.
(d) Lyke's Appeal,106 Pa St.626.
te) Ballard v Tomlinson,L.R.29 C.D.115.
(f) Eaton v B M & C R.R. 51 N.H.504.
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N
Having now given a more or less imperfect outline of the
cases bearing upon the subject of what constitutes a taking of
private property for a public use,we cannot but look back with
gratitude to the framers of our Constitution,who so early in
our public career,before the advent of railways,steamboats,
electricity,t&hegraph and telephone companies and other modern
inventionsforesaw and provided against the opression of
private citizens,by inserting in the Constitution these pro-
visions,even though the word "taking" has proved such an ambi-
guity and a fruitful source of litigation. Their prudence,
sagacity and foresight ordained the true bulwark of American
liberty,for without such proper check anarchy and misrule
would lead the country to ruin. These provisions have gone
through stormy scenes and have always triumpked,and the present
effort only echoes the conclusions reached under them.May our
gratitude for these safeguards,and our honor for those who
framed them continue to grow as each successive obstacle is
overcome.
